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ABSTRACT 
 Medical practitioners may have information that could be used to determine 
whether an individual poses a violent threat to the community. However, legal and 
cultural barriers often prevent information sharing between the medical field and law 
enforcement. This thesis examines the impact of laws and regulations such as HIPAA, 
FERPA, 42 CFR Part 2, and state duty-to-warn laws, and recommends a legal analysis of 
these laws to determine whether modifications are necessary. It suggests that states could 
enact individual laws that mandate information sharing between the medical community 
and law enforcement for the purposes of threat assessment, which would then allow 
release of the information under HIPAA and 42 CFR Part 2. It also suggests training for 
both law enforcement and the medical community to ensure they understand how to 
apply these laws, as well as joint exercises to enhance collaboration and trust. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
vii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................1 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT .......................................................................1 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS .......................................................................2 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW .........................................................................2 
1. Cooperation Based on Procedural Justice ...................................3 
2. Cooperation Based on Perceived Police Effectiveness ................6 
3. Cooperation Based on Self-Identity Match with Police..............7 
D. RESEARCH DESIGN .............................................................................10 
1. Selection Criteria .........................................................................10 
2. Limits ............................................................................................10 
3. Data Sources .................................................................................10 
4. Type of Analysis ...........................................................................11 
5. Outputs..........................................................................................11 
II. THE NEED FOR MEDICAL COMMUNITY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ENGAGEMENT IN THREAT ASSESSMENT ...............13 
A. INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE A VIOLENT THREAT .........................13 
1. Virginia Tech Shootings ..............................................................14 
2. Aurora, Colorado, Movie Theater Attack .................................16 
3. University of California Attacks .................................................17 
4. Parkland, Florida, School Shooting ...........................................18 
B. THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS AND TOOLS ................19 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................22 
III. FACTORS THAT AFFECT INFORMATION SHARING .............................23 
A. PRIVACY CONCERNS ..........................................................................23 
1. United States Constitution ..........................................................23 
2. Ethics for Medical Personnel ......................................................24 
B. LAWS THAT AFFECT MEDICAL INFORMATION 
SHARING .................................................................................................25 
1. HIPAA ...........................................................................................27 
2. FERPA ..........................................................................................29 
3. 42 CFR Part 2 ...............................................................................30 
4. State Duty-to-Warn Laws ...........................................................31 
C. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................34 
IV. INTELLIGENCE / INFORMATION SHARING ............................................35 
viii 
A. FUSION CENTERS.................................................................................35 
1. Public Health Participation in Fusion Centers .........................38 
B. OTHER PROGRAMS THAT ENABLE INFORMATION 
SHARING BY MEDICAL PROVIDERS .............................................39 
1. Child Abuse ..................................................................................40 
2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) .................41 
3. Injuries Caused by Violence .......................................................42 
C. MENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH DATA SHARING ..........43 
1. Criminal Justice and Behavioral Health Collaborations .........43 
2. Reporting Related to Gun Purchases .........................................44 
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................47 
V. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................49 
A. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS......................................49 
1. Privacy Laws Are Deficient.........................................................49 
2. Training on Privacy Laws Is Deficient ......................................51 
3. Collaboration between Law Enforcement and the 
Medical Community Is Necessary ..............................................53 
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .................................................54 
C. SUMMARY ..............................................................................................54 
LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................57 




LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Duty-to-Warn Laws by State .....................................................................33 
Figure 2. State Laws that Require or Authorize the Reporting of Mental Health 
Records to NICS ........................................................................................46 
x 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xi 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Mental Health Symptoms: Mass-Casualty Attack Perpetrators, 2017 .......20 
 
xii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xiii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
CFC  Commonwealth Fusion Center 
CFR  Code of Federal Regulations 
EDP  emotional disturbed person 
FERPA Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act 
HIPAA Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 
NICS  National Instant Criminal Background Check System 
NSI  Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative  
NTAC  National Threat Assessment Center (United States Secret Service) 
PDMP  prescription drug monitoring program 
PHI  protected health information 
SAR  Suspicious Activity Report  
xiv 




The nature of violent attacks, including terrorist attacks, in the United States has 
evolved. Such small-scale incidents as edged-weapon attacks, small-arms attacks, and 
vehicles used as weapons have become more prevalent. These types of events require 
minimal resources and planning by the perpetrators, and they do not require a large 
network; they often involve just one individual. The opportunity for law enforcement to 
discover or disrupt such attacks is limited. Individuals may disclose information to medical 
professionals that they would not disclose to family, friends, or even their spouse. Such 
information may include indicators suggesting that the person is radicalizing or has a 
propensity for violence. Others may exhibit mental instability or paranoia that could lead 
to extreme actions. Law enforcement does not have an effective mechanism for 
understanding how an individual’s medical condition—including mental illnesses or 
behavioral disorders—may influence the person’s behavior in order to accurately assess 
their risk to the community.  
Failure to identify individuals who pose a violent criminal threat to society often 
results in grave consequences. Medical practitioners—mental health providers and non-
mental health professionals alike—may encounter, in their daily work, individuals who 
present a violent threat to the community. Threat assessment frameworks emphasize the 
need for information sharing between the medical community and law enforcement. The 
ability to conduct an accurate threat assessment depends on the analysis of all existing 
information about a subject’s previous behavior and medical conditions. When medical 
personnel learn of a potential threat to the community, even if it is not imminent, there 
needs to be a mechanism for them to share the information with law enforcement. If law 
enforcement receives a tip related to a threat by an individual, they need a mechanism to 
collect all relevant information in order to assess the validity of the threat.  
This thesis sought to answer the following questions: How can law enforcement 
enhance information sharing with the medical community to identify individuals who may 
pose a threat of committing violent criminal or terrorist acts? Are there laws or policies 
that need to be created or changed in order to foster better communication? To answer these 
xvi 
questions, the research analyzed existing laws and regulations as well as programs already 
in existence that allow information sharing between the two disciplines.  
Though medical practitioners may have information that could potentially disrupt 
a violent attack or explain a person’s abnormal behavior, laws including the Health 
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA), and 42 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 2, limit the 
information that can be shared with law enforcement. Furthermore, some state duty-to-
warn laws are inadequate, applying only when there is imminent danger. Research 
indicates that when these regulations are put into practice, they are usually interpreted in a 
narrower and more conservative manner than intended. The fear of retribution, whether 
legal or regulatory, causes practitioners to err on the side of caution and avoid sharing 
information, which impacts law enforcement’s ability to prevent some violent attacks. 
Privacy concerns, ethical guidelines, and organizational culture all may impact information 
sharing between the medical community and law enforcement. Current laws and programs 
are insufficient to proactively address the threat of violence to the community.  
There are several intelligence and information sharing initiatives already in place 
that encourage or allow information sharing between the medical community and law 
enforcement. These initiatives involve cases of child or elder abuse, injuries sustained by 
gunshots or knives, and prescription monitoring programs. Additionally, public health 
regulations often require medical professionals to report cases of certain diseases in order 
to prevent outbreaks. Mental health and behavioral health data sharing is allowed for an 
individual who is incarcerated or to prevent individuals with certain illnesses from 
purchasing a firearm. There has been a concerted effort to incorporate public health into 
fusion centers, which include public health partners. Information sharing with fusion 
centers would allow law enforcement to more proactively identify suspicious activity 
before a violent incident occurs.  
The nature of violent attacks necessitates better integration of all relevant 
information about a subject’s background, both criminal and medical, to inform threat 
assessments and ensure the public’s safety. A review of past violent incidents has shown 
that the lack of information sharing between the medical community and law enforcement 
xvii 
has contributed to law enforcement’s inability to thwart attacks before they happen. 
Though it would be impossible to prevent every violent attack, having more information 
available for threat assessments will improve our ability to preempt some attacks.  
Four recommendations are provided. The first recommendation is to conduct a legal 
analysis of HIPAA, FERPA, 42 CFR Part 2, and state duty-to-warn laws, which inhibit the 
ability of law enforcement and the medical community to share medical information for 
threat assessment purposes. Second, states could enact individual laws that mandate 
information sharing between the medical community and law enforcement for the purposes 
of threat assessment, which would then allow release of the information under HIPAA and 
42 CFR Part 2. Third, training should be provided to law enforcement and the medical 
community to ensure they understand the circumstances in which information sharing is 
allowable and the extent of the information that can be shared. Finally, opportunities for 
the two disciplines to work together—such as during joint exercises—will foster greater 
mutual understanding among the different disciplines. 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The nature of violent attacks, including terrorist attacks, in the United States has 
evolved. Such small-scale incidents as edged-weapon attacks, small-arms attacks, and 
vehicles used as weapons have become more prevalent. These types of events require 
minimal resources and planning by the perpetrators, and they do not require a large 
network; they often involve just one individual. Law enforcement’s opportunity to discover 
or disrupt such attacks is limited. The public must play an ever-increasing role in reporting 
suspicious behavior to law enforcement in order to identify threats to the community, 
particularly when one person or a small group intends to instigate a small-scale attack.  
This type of public cooperation requires the assistance of other disciplines, 
including the medical community. Individuals may disclose information to medical 
professionals that they would not disclose to family, friends, or even their spouse. Such 
information may include indicators that suggest the person is radicalizing or has a 
propensity for violence. Others may exhibit mental instability or paranoia that could lead 
to extreme actions. Research suggests that homegrown violent extremists and those who 
commit other types of violent attacks, such as mass-casualty attacks, have similar 
“behavioral and psychological characteristics.”1 Law enforcement does not have an 
effective mechanism for understanding how an individual’s medical condition—including 
mental illness or behavioral disorders—may influence the person’s behavior in order to 
accurately assess risk.  
Restrictions such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 
1996 (HIPAA) dictate the circumstances under which information may be shared. 
Dr. David Rosmarin, director of forensic psychology at McLean Hospital, suggests that 
doctors may be the only ones who know about an individual’s “serious and imminent 
                                                 
1 John D. Cohen, “The Next Generation of Government CVE Strategies at Home: Expanding 
Opportunities for Intervention,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 668, 
no.1 (November 1, 2016): 122–123, https://doi.org/10.1177/000271621666993. 
2 
threat” to the community.2 It is a common misconception among members of the medical 
and law enforcement communities that HIPAA precludes the sharing of patient information 
under any circumstance, even when there is imminent danger.3 However, HIPAA provides 
exceptions that allow “protected health information” (PHI) to be shared with law 
enforcement without the patient’s consent.4 For example, according to HIPAA, medical 
professionals can “report PHI to a law enforcement official [who is] reasonably able to 
prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of an individual or 
the public.”5 In addition to HIPAA regulations, legal requirements or even organizational 
culture, as well as cognitive bias on the part of the health care community, may prevent 
some information from being shared.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
How can law enforcement enhance information sharing with the medical 
community to identify individuals who may pose a threat of committing violent criminal 
or terrorist acts? Are there laws or policies that need to be created or changed in order to 
foster better communication?  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review assesses works that explore the reasons why the public 
cooperates with the police. It provides a foundation for understanding what motivates the 
public to report criminal or suspicious activity. Specifically, it looks at public cooperation, 
                                                 
2 Erin Schumaker, “Doctors Often Know Who Might Commit Gun Violence. But They Can’t Do 
Much about It,” Huffington Post, March 1, 2018, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/doctors-gun-
violence-hipaa_us_5a95a39be4b0bef79e3086ab. 
3 The author of this thesis, Amy Thibault, has eighteen years of experience in intelligence analysis, the 
last ten of which she has been spent as the intelligence services manager at the Commonwealth Fusion 
Center (CFC). Since 2010, she has supervised the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative at 
the CFC, where she has seen this misconception firsthand.  
4 “What is PHI?,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, February 26, 2013, www.hhs.gov/ 
answers/hipaa/what-is-phi/index.html. 
5 “Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide for Law 




which is necessary for successful crime prevention campaigns. Law enforcement has 
sought the public’s assistance with crime prevention through such community-oriented 
efforts as the Take a Bite Out of Crime campaign in 1979 and “neighborhood watch,” in 
which private citizens assist law enforcement with detecting and solving crimes.6 Tom 
Tyler suggests that “these cooperative efforts are largely voluntary in character, and the 
police are not generally in a position to reward members of the public for their aid. Instead, 
the police rely on willing public cooperation with police efforts to control crime and 
community disorder.”7 In other words, the public is vital to the success of the police.  
Scholars over the past fifteen years have focused on cooperation to explain the 
public’s willingness to participate. Three main theories emerged from the review of 
contemporary literature: the procedural justice model, the instrumental model, and identity 
theories. While the three theories disagree as to which factor most effectively motivates 
the public, all of them focus on the public’s perception of the police. Aziz Huq, Tom Tyler, 
and Stephen Schulhofer compare and contrast the perception of law enforcement 
legitimacy with its perceived effectiveness, while Ben Bradford considers the perception 
of the police as part of the same social group in determining motivating factors of 
cooperation.8 The most prevalent theory is the theory of procedural justice, which is 
focused on legitimacy.9 
1. Cooperation Based on Procedural Justice 
According to Huq, Tyler and Schulhofer, “the ‘procedural justice’ model of 
policing contends that people’s reactions to law enforcement are shaped primarily by 
                                                 
6 Garrett J. O’Keefe, “Taking a Bite out of Crime”: The Impact of a Public Information Campaign,” 
Communication Research 12, no. 2 (1985): 149–150, https://doi.org/10.1177/009365085012002001; Tom 
R. Tyler, “Enhancing Police Legitimacy,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 593, no. 1 (2004): 85, https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716203262627. 
7 Tyler, “Enhancing Police Legitimacy,” 85.  
8 Aziz Z. Huq, Tom R. Tyler, and Stephen J. Schulhofer, “Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law 
Enforcement? The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing,” Psychology, Public Policy, and Law 
17, no. 3 (2011): 5, http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0023367; Ben Bradford, “Policing and Social Identity: 
Procedural Justice, Inclusion and Cooperation Between Police and Public,” Policing and Society 24, no. 1 
(2014): 23, https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2012.724068.  
9 Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer, “Why Does the Public Cooperate,” 5. 
4 
evaluations of the fairness of police conduct.”10 Factors that influence police legitimacy in 
the procedural justice model include “neutrality, trust, and respect.”11 The public correlates 
police fairness with legitimacy, which leads to cooperation.12 Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan 
agree, adding that “this includes both deferring to their decisions during personal 
encounters and generally obeying legal rules in their everyday lives. Furthermore, people 
are more cooperative in helping the police to deal with crime in their communities when 
they view the police as legitimate.”13 
Tyler and Fagan contend that the public views the police as just when they are 
shown respect and the police have regard for their civil rights.14 Even individuals who 
experience a negative result from an interaction with law enforcement may still perceive 
the police as legitimate as long as the situation was handled in a fair and objective 
manner.15 Tyler asserts that “the quality of interpersonal treatment is consistently found to 
be a distinct element of fairness, separate from the quality of the decision-making process. 
Above and beyond the resolution of their problems, people value being treated with 
politeness and having their rights acknowledged.”16  
Justin Nix refers to the procedural justice model as the process-based model, and 
his 2017 study disagreed with the majority of procedural justice studies; it concluded that 
officers in the study “believe performance to be the primary means of attaining cooperation 
from citizens in high-crime areas.”17  
                                                 
10 Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer, 5. 
11 Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer, 22. 
12 Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer, 5. 
13 Tyler, “Enhancing Police Legitimacy,” 89. 
14 Tom R. Tyler and Jeffrey Fagan, “Legitimacy and Cooperation: Why Do People Help the Police 
Fight Crime in their Communities,” Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 6 (2008): 253, http://digital 
commons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4027&context=fss_papers.  
15 Tyler and Fagan, 262. 
16 Tyler, “Enhancing Police Legitimacy,” 94–95. 
17 Justin Nix, “Do the Police Believe That Legitimacy Promotes Cooperation from the Public?,” 
Crime & Delinquency 63, no. 8 (July 2017): 968, https://doi.org/10.1177/0011128715597696.  
5 
Much of the literature compares the procedural justice model with the instrumental 
model, in which cooperation is based on performance rather than on fairness.18 Hybrid 
theories are formed by joining portions of the procedural justice model with additional 
elements such as belonging to the same social group or a person’s role in society.19 Several 
studies have shown that legitimacy, rather than instrumental factors, affects cooperation 
with law enforcement.20  
As procedural justice is based on legitimacy, it is necessary to explore the concept 
of legitimacy. The term legitimacy is often used interchangeably with the terms status and 
reputation, even though they have different meanings.21 Legitimacy, for the police, is most 
closely correlated with government legitimacy. Much of the related literature concerns the 
legitimacy of the government’s rise to power, such as whether or not the government was 
elected, and if it is considered legitimate by other governments.22 According to Carl J. 
Friedrich, “the ‘question of legitimacy’ is the ‘question of fact whether a given rulership 
is believed to be based on good title by most men subject to it.’”23 Good title, according 
to Peter G. Stillman, refers to the way in which the ruler ascended to power.24 Jean 
d’Aspremont contends that internal legitimacy, how government “is perceived by the 
people subject to it,” is different from external legitimacy, “how it is perceived by other 
                                                 
18 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler, “The Role of Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping 
Public Support for Policing,” Law & Society Review 37, no. 3 (2003): 514, https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-
5893.3703002.  
19 Bradford, “Policing and Social Identity,” 23; Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. 
White, “A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory,” 
Social Psychology Quarterly 58, no. 4 (December 1995): 256, http://libproxy.nps.edu/login?url= 
https://search.proquest.com/docview/212697365?accountid=12702.  
20 Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer, “Why Does the Public Cooperate,” 19. 
21 David L. Deephouse and Mark Suchman, “Legitimacy in Organizational Institutionalism,” in The 
SAGE Handbook of Organizational Institutionalism, eds. Royston Greenwood, Christine Oliver, Roy 
Suddaby, and Kerstin Sahlin (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2008), 60–62, http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/ 
9781849200387.n2.  
22 Peter G. Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy,” Polity 7, no. 1 (Autumn 1974): 34, www.jstor.org/ 
stable/3234268.  
23 Stillman, 34. 
24 Stillman, 34. 
6 
governments.”25 Stillman argues that “all definitions of legitimacy involve making 
evaluative decisions.”26 If legitimacy is subjective, it would be hard to replicate in terms 
of public cooperation.  
2. Cooperation Based on Perceived Police Effectiveness 
The instrumental model focuses on the “effectiveness of the police in managing 
crime and social order.”27 The instrumental model correlates the public’s willingness to 
cooperate with police to specific measurable goals, such as number of arrests or other 
measures of productivity.28 Jason Sunshine and Tom R. Tyler add that 
people’s willingness to accept and cooperate with legal authorities is linked 
to evaluations of police performance, to risk, and to judgments about 
distributive justice. This model, the instrumental perspective, suggests that 
the police gain acceptance when they are viewed by the public as (1) 
creating credible sanctioning threats for those who break rules (risk), (2) 
effectively controlling crime and criminal behavior (performance), and (3) 
fairly distributing police services across people and communities 
(distributive fairness).29  
Nix’s study, along with the work of Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer, supports the instrumental 
model, concluding that performance is more important than legitimacy in citizen 
cooperation.30 Masahiro Tsushima and Koichi Hamai believe that perceived law 
enforcement effectiveness can have a deterrent effect and “that social order is maintained 
by the sanctioning of misbehavior and criminal offenses.”31 They continue: “That is, 
people who value police effectiveness tend to think that they will be caught and sanctioned 
                                                 
25 Jean d’Aspremont, “Legitimacy of Governments in the Age of Democracy,” New York University 
Journal of International Law and Politics 38 (2005): 882. 
26 Stillman, “The Concept of Legitimacy,” 34. 
27 Huq, Tyler, and Schulhofer, “Why Does the Public Cooperate,” 19. 
28 Sunshine and Tyler, “Procedural Justice and Legitimacy,” 514. 
29 Sunshine and Tyler, 514. 
30 Nix, “Police Legitimacy,” 19 
31 Masahiro Tsushima and Koichi Hamai, “Public Cooperation with the Police in Japan,” Journal of 
Contemporary Criminal Justice 31, no. 2 (May 2015): 215, https://doi.org/10.1177/1043986214568836.  
7 
if they break the law (perceived sanctions) and therefore comply with the law and cooperate 
with the police.”32  
Tyler and Fagan’s 2008 study also supports Nix and the instrumental model, 
agreeing that individuals cooperate more when they believe police are “effective and that 
the police create a credible threat of punishment for wrongdoing.”33 Sunshine and Tyler 
found that after an attack such as 9/11, procedural justice becomes less important and 
citizens concentrate more on effectiveness.34  
While some studies assert that effectiveness is the most important factor in 
cooperation with police, an equal amount of the literature disagrees with this assertion and 
many studies had contrary results. Opposing views, such as those expressed by Huq, Tyler, 
and Schulhofer, suggest that legitimacy, rather than effectiveness, is most important in 
public cooperation.35 Michael A. Hogg, Deborah J. Terry, and Katherine M. White discuss 
cooperation in terms of identity with either a sense of belonging or an individual’s role 
being the most important factor.36 
3. Cooperation Based on Self-Identity Match with Police 
Social identity theory, according to David Brannan, Kristin Darken, and Anders 
Strindberg, contends that “an individual’s sense of self and self-worth is derived from the 
associations he or she has with the groups of which he or she is a part.”37 Individuals will 
remain in a group as long as they feel that their membership benefits them in some way.38 
Research by Bradford in the United Kingdom draws on social identity theory and combines 
it with procedural justice theory to create the “group value theory of procedural justice,” 
                                                 
32 Tsushima and Hamai, 215. 
33 Tyler and Fagan, “Legitimacy and Cooperation,” 263. 
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which suggests that in-group dynamics have an effect on cooperation.39 The public’s 
perception of police fairness causes them to more closely identify with “the social group 
the police represent—the imagined local or national community.”40 This in-group identity 
positively affects their interactions with police.41  
Bradford also asserts that “when people feel fairly treated by group authorities this 
indicates (a) that they are included and have status within the group and (b) that the group 
itself is worthwhile and something to be proud of.”42 Bradford raises concerns about the 
relevance of the group value theory to those who are members of a different religious, 
ethnic, or social group; he found, however, that “even in highly diverse contexts … people 
from different ethnic groups place a broadly similar weight on the fairness of the police in 
their overall judgements of the police and in the formation of their judgements about 
potential acts of cooperation.”43 
Gary LaFree and Amy Adamczyk also contend that social identity theory may help 
explain the public’s willingness to cooperate following terrorist attacks. Their article, 
which focused on the aftermath of Boston Marathon bombing attack, states, “According to 
the in-group/out-group hypothesis, under the right circumstances, external conflicts can 
lead to greater internal cohesion of social groups”44 In what has been referred to as the 
rally effect, citizens—when threatened by terrorists who are viewed as the out-group—are 
more likely to support their in-group, which consists of “their government and its 
representatives and the police are the most visible representatives of the state.”45 Bradford 
agrees that “legitimate authorities generate a sense of duty among those they govern that 
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43 Bradford, 26. 
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motivates cooperation.”46 If law enforcement can make the public feel like a part of the in-
group, it may have a positive influence on public cooperation with police.  
Hogg, Terry, and White compare identity theory with social identity theory, 
contending, “The two theories occupy parallel but separate universes, with virtually no 
cross-referencing … and to our knowledge no published attempt has been made to 
systematically compare them.”47 They identify one difference between the theories, 
asserting that “identity theory is principally a micro socio-logical theory that sets out to 
explain individuals’ role-related behaviors, while social identity theory is a social 
psychological theory that sets out to explain group processes and intergroup relations.”48 
They continue: “both theories place their major theoretical emphasis on a multi-faceted and 
dynamic self that mediates the relationship between social structure and individual 
behavior.”49 According to identity theory, people have multiple role identities, as opposed 
to social identity theory, in which identity is based on belonging to one or more groups.50 
Finally, Hogg, Terry, and White argue that identity theory treats “the self not as an 
autonomous psychological entity but as a multifaceted social construct that emerges from 
people’s roles in society.”51  
Nancy Buchanan et al. studied cooperation from the perspective of global social 
identity, stating that “many global problems are social dilemmas, situations in which 
individuals must choose between behaviors serving self-interest and behaviors benefiting 
the collective welfare.”52 They argue that “collectively, everyone is better off if all 
contribute, even though cooperation involves self-sacrifice at the individual level.”53 
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Similar to social identity theory, global social identity explains that “levels of cooperation 
are significantly higher when shared in-group identity is made salient or group members 
strongly identify with the collective than when no shared identity is available or group 
identification is weak.”54  
D. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The object of this research is to identify legal and cultural barriers to sharing threat 
information between law enforcement and medical professionals. 
1. Selection Criteria 
Research focused on statutes, regulations, and policies that allow or prohibit 
medical information from being shared with law enforcement when there is a perceived 
threat to the community. Successful examples of information sharing between the medical 
community and law enforcement were examined. Cultural and cognitive biases on behalf 
of both law enforcement and the medical community that inhibit information sharing also 
were analyzed.  
2. Limits 
This thesis focuses on the problem of sharing medical information with law 
enforcement in the United States. It does not focus on sharing any other types of 
information, and it does not discuss sharing medical information with any disciplines other 
than law enforcement, nor with the general public. The concept of threat assessment is 
introduced in so far as to scope the problems of sharing medical information. This thesis 
does not focus on methods, benefits, or criticisms of threat assessment.  
3. Data Sources 
Data from professional journals, law review journals, and state and federal statutes 
is included in the data set. The literature review served to examine theories of cooperation 
with law enforcement—such as those between the public and law enforcement—in order 
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to examine smart practices for cooperation that may be applicable to cooperation between 
the medical community and law enforcement. 
4. Type of Analysis 
This thesis is qualitative in nature; it analyzes statutes, regulations, and programs 
that allow or prohibit medical information from being shared with law enforcement when 
there is a perceived threat to the community. Successful examples of information sharing 
between the medical community and law enforcement were analyzed to determine if any 
lessons could be learned from existing programs that may be applicable to sharing threat 
information. Cultural and cognitive biases on behalf of both law enforcement and the 
medical community that inhibit information sharing also were analyzed. After defining the 
problem, research focused on gathering data to determine the scope of the problem.55 Data 
about current policies, as well as policies “that have worked effectively in situations 
apparently similar” were also analyzed.56  
5. Outputs 
After defining the scope of the problem, this thesis sets forth recommendations to 
be considered by the United States government in order to enhance information sharing 
between the medical community and law enforcement for the purposes of threat 
assessment.  
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II. THE NEED FOR MEDICAL COMMUNITY AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT ENGAGEMENT IN THREAT ASSESSMENT 
Medical practitioners—mental health providers and non–mental health 
professionals alike—have the potential to encounter, in their daily work, individuals who 
may present a violent threat to the community. These individuals’ aggressive conduct may 
be exacerbated by behavioral or mental health issues. These individuals may confide in 
medical personnel because of the trusted relationship patients often share with their 
physician or nurse. Sociologist Mario Luis Small, in his study regarding an individual’s 
“core discussion network, the set of friends and family people turn to when discussing 
important matters,” found that “45% of the core discussion network is composed of people 
whom respondents do not consider important to them. In fact, the core discussion network 
includes doctors, coworkers, spiritual leaders, and other alters whom ego confides in 
without feeling emotionally attached to.” 57 
Threat assessment frameworks emphasize the need for information sharing 
between the medical community and law enforcement. This chapter explores some of those 
frameworks and provides examples of individuals who acted out their violent tendencies, 
causing loss of life. The literature demonstrates that increased information sharing about 
individuals who pose a threat to the community may allow law enforcement to disrupt 
future violent attacks.  
A. INDIVIDUALS WHO POSE A VIOLENT THREAT 
The need to identify individuals who pose a violent criminal threat to society is a 
persistent issue. Failure to do so often results in grave consequences. Examples such as the 
mass shooting that occurred at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia 
Tech) in 2007, the attack on a movie theatre in Aurora, Colorado, in 2012, the killing spree 
of Elliot Rodger near the University of California, Santa Barbara, campus in 2014, and the 
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school shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, in 2018 
illustrate the ongoing need for information sharing between the medical community and 
law enforcement. Each of these incidents illustrates an instance where medical personnel 
had knowledge about the individual who committed these acts—information that may have 
helped prevent the incident from occurring. It is not feasible for every act of violence to be 
avoided; however, barriers to sharing information with law enforcement inhibit 
opportunities for disruption.  
1. Virginia Tech Shootings 
On April 16, 2007, senior student Seung Hi Cho went on a killing spree at Virginia 
Tech, which ended when Cho, about to be captured, killed himself. His actions left thirty-
three people, including himself, dead and seventeen more injured.58 Prior to Cho’s 
rampage, he was exhibiting “deviant behavior—stalking, taking cell-phone photos of 
female students during class, violent writing, and unwillingness to participate in class,” as 
well as threats to take his own life.59  
There were many failures to communicate leading up to the Virginia Tech 
shootings. The Virginia Tech Care Team, a multidisciplinary university group that assists 
students with behavioral issues, was notified of Cho’s behavior but did not follow up with 
him.60 The school believed that they could not disclose Cho’s disciplinary records to law 
enforcement due to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).61 Therefore, 
campus police were not aware of other behavioral issues Cho was having on campus when 
they interacted with him. Campus police were alerted to Cho’s behavior by a student who 
called to complain, as well as by his roommate, who reported that Cho was suicidal.62 Cho 
was held overnight due to his suicidal thoughts under a “temporary detention order” and 
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mandated to undergo counseling through the school, but the university counselors did not 
contact his previous mental health providers.63 Cho’s previous medical provider was aware 
“that he had been fascinated by the Columbine High School shootings in 1999, and that he 
had fantasized about carrying out a similar mass killing.”64 This information could have 
been used by the university counselors and campus police to develop a complete threat 
picture when Cho began exhibiting concerning behavior.  
Following the tragedy at Virginia Tech, then-Virginia Governor Tim Kaine formed 
a multi-disciplinary panel to come up with lessons learned from the tragedy. 
Recommendations included the following:  
(3) Congress and the state legislatures should review federal and state 
privacy laws, and universities should know what they do and do not permit. 
HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act), FERPA 
(the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act), and state privacy laws 
should be reviewed to ensure that they are compatible and that they meet 
the real needs of our society.  
(4) Colleges and universities should communicate, both within themselves 
and beyond. Institutions need to break through current barriers to 
communication to ensure that information about potential threats is shared 
by everyone who needs to know. …. 
(7) Develop a way to access students’ mental-health records. Records of 
immunization travel with us from early childhood through institution after 
institution. But a college or university does not get records about 
communicable diseases, not to mention serious mental-health problems, 
psychotropic medications (which a student may stop taking), or special-
education programs that may have helped a student in high school. This 
information clearly should not be used in admissions. But later, perhaps 
while choosing courses, students might be asked to sign waivers allowing 
the institution access to their health records. At the least, university staff 
should be expected to ask the parents of a student whose behavior causes 
concern for access to her or his health records.65 
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More than ten years after the Virginia Tech tragedy, HIPAA and FERPA have not been 
amended in order to allow for increased information sharing between the medical 
community and law enforcement. This also makes it difficult to implement 
recommendation four, regarding communication, and recommendation seven, regarding 
access to mental health records.  
2. Aurora, Colorado, Movie Theater Attack 
On July 20, 2012, James Holmes shot and killed twelve individuals and injured 
seventy others in an attack at a movie theatre in Aurora, Colorado, during a viewing of The 
Dark Night Rises. Numerous explosive devices were found in Holmes’ apartment. Holmes, 
who was a graduate student at the University of Colorado at the time, had sought treatment 
at the student health center due to homicidal thoughts.66 The psychiatrist he was seeing, 
Dr. Lynne Fenton, later testified that she believed Holmes had obsessive compulsive 
disorder and “had thoughts of killing people. But she didn’t think he was imminently 
dangerous.”67 Holmes told Fenton “six weeks before the shooting that he fantasized about 
killing ‘a lot of people.’”68 Fenton told a campus police officer, who offered to have 
Holmes involuntarily committed, but the therapist declined, believing he was not a threat.69 
After the killing spree, a notebook that detailed Holmes’s plans and was intended for 
Fenton was discovered in a university mailroom.70 Fenton did not report Holmes to law 
enforcement officers outside the university. Though threat assessment frameworks stress 
the importance of law enforcement inclusion, Fenton determined on her own that Holmes 
was not a threat, even though he was experiencing murderous thoughts shortly before this 
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tragic incident. Because mental health treatment records and Holmes’s homicidal thoughts 
were not shared with law enforcement, law enforcement was unable to help assess whether 
or not Holmes posed a threat to himself or the community.  
3. University of California Attacks 
On May 23, 2014, Elliot Rodger went on a killing spree during which he stabbed 
and shot victims and ran others over with his vehicle, killing six and injuring fourteen.71 
The crime spree started at his apartment, where he murdered his roommates, and continued 
at various locations, with a total of seventeen crime scenes.72  
Rodger had minor interactions with police over the years, including theft 
allegations against his roommate, reported vandalism to his vehicle, involvement in a fight, 
and a welfare check on April 30, 2014.73 During the welfare check, which occurred twenty-
three days before this incident, law enforcement was in contact with Rodger’s mother; the 
only information they had about Rodger’s mental state came from this phone call, during 
which his mother mentioned her son had been posting videos online in which he appeared 
to be lonely.74 Rodger wrote a 137-page manifesto titled My Twisted World.75 It is 
unknown when he wrote the manifesto, which he emailed on May 23, 2014, to his life skills 
coach and numerous others, including his mother and therapists.76 The coach contacted 
Rodger’s mother, who contacted police, but Rodger was already in the midst of his killing 
spree.77 Law enforcement may have benefited from additional information regarding 
Rodger’s medical diagnosis at the time of the welfare check. It is impossible to know, 
however, if this would have changed the outcome on May 23, 2014.  
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4. Parkland, Florida, School Shooting 
Most recently, on February 14, 2018, a gunman opened fire on students and 
teachers at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida, killing seventeen 
and injuring fourteen others.78 The gunman, Nikolas Cruz, was a former student who had 
been expelled the previous school year.79 Cruz was in therapy for much of his teen years 
and told a school psychiatrist that he dreamed about “killing people and being drenched in 
human blood.”80 Students at the school recalled that “Cruz would talk about his ‘guns, 
knives and hunting,’ and that ‘everyone predicted’ he would turn into a school shooter.”81 
Cruz made posts on social media referencing school shootings prior to the incident.82  
Around 2014, Cruz’s mother planned to buy him a gun for his birthday.83 She 
received mixed messages from two different therapists, with one telling her it was a bad 
idea and that he should not have weapons, while another therapist suggested she use the 
gun as a reward for good behavior.84 At least twice when police responded to the Cruz 
home due to Cruz’s violent behavior, therapists determined he was not a threat and told the 
police that he did not need to be committed.85 Cruz was able to purchase the weapon he 
used in the attack legally, as he had never been committed and was therefore not legally 
banned from purchasing a firearm.86  
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There were many potential opportunities for law enforcement or the medical 
community to disrupt Cruz’s plans—from tips that allegedly were not followed up on to 
information the therapists possessed, such as observations of Cruz’s behavior and 
statements that Cruz made to the therapists, which could have been used in a threat 
assessment.87 Law enforcement had many interactions with Cruz over the years, but 
without access to his mental health counseling records and detailed information about his 
violent tendencies, they were at a disadvantage when it came to completing a threat 
assessment. In cases such as this, it is imperative that law enforcement and the medical 
community work together to protect not only the individual, but society as well.  
B. THREAT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORKS AND TOOLS 
The United States Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) 
conducted an analysis of mass-casualty attacks that took place across the United States in 
2017. The analysis included attacks that occurred in public and that injured at least three 
people. In all, twenty-eight attacks were analyzed. The NTAC found that 54 percent of the 
attackers had behavioral health issues, including drug or substance abuse, and 64 percent 
had a history of mental health symptoms, including “psychosis (e.g., paranoia, 
hallucinations, or delusions) and suicidal thoughts” (see Table 1).88  
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The NTAC also discovered that, even in cases for which the perpetrators had subscribed to 
an ideology that contributed to the attack, “their particular psychosis played a dominant 
role in the adoption of their belief system.”90  
The NTAC also published a review of attacks on the federal government between 
2001 and 2013. In this document, NTAC refers to guidelines it previously published for 
state and local law enforcement in January 2000 that contain areas, or concepts, to be 
considered during a threat assessment investigation, one of which is the “history of mental 
illness.”91 In the current document, NTAC suggests investigators “ask detailed questions 
to explore the link between mental health symptoms and an individual’s motive and 
behavior,” specifically, “whether they impact the person’s decision to carry out an 
attack.”92 The NTAC contends that it is important to determine what “community systems” 
might have information such as “concerning behaviors, mental health symptoms, stressors, 
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and other relevant background information” about the subject of a threat assessment.93 The 
NTAC also recognizes that state and federal laws, including HIPAA and FERPA, may 
inhibit a threat assessment team’s access to certain records, such as those from colleges or 
mental health facilities. The NTAC noted that “unlike judicial or law enforcement records, 
the disclosure of educational, employment, and mental health records generally requires 
either the consent of the individual under investigation or an express statutory or regulatory 
exception.”94 
Another concept to take into account in threat assessment is leakage. Leakage is 
defined by J. Reid Meloy and Mary Ellen O’Toole as “the communication to a third party 
of an intent to do harm to a target.”95 Leakage may occur during a medical appointment, 
whether to a mental health or medical professional. In some cases, this leakage could 
trigger a duty to warn. However, the duty to warn, which is discussed further in Chapter 
III, is only applicable in cases of an imminent threat and is not mandatory in all states. 
Notification of leakage by a medical provider to law enforcement would allow law 
enforcement to address the validity of the information through other sources such as family 
members, community members, or the individual of concern.  
Michelle Keeney and Lina Alathari contend that local law enforcement is a 
necessary component for threat assessments. They elaborate, “prevention efforts are more 
effective when community partners collaborate to include law enforcement, behavioral and 
mental health services, social services, local citizens and others.”96 Law enforcement has 
historically been reactive, responding or investigating after a crime has been committed. In 
contrast, “proactive policing is getting out in front of events in the hopes of preventing 
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crimes and working with the community to reduce crimes.”97 The nature of violent attacks 
in the United States makes law enforcement community relations, including those with 
medical professionals, more important than ever. 
C. CONCLUSION 
While the incidents described in this chapter concern individuals with mental health 
disorders, behavioral health issues or other medical conditions could also contribute to 
behavior that would cause an individual to commit violent acts in the community. 
Regardless of the cause of the threatening behavior, when medical personnel learn of a 
potential threat to the community, even if it is not imminent, there needs to be a mechanism 
for them to share the information with law enforcement. If law enforcement receives a tip 
related to a threat by an individual, they need a mechanism to collect all relevant 
information in order to assess the validity of the threat. If law enforcement is aware that 
the individual is seeking treatment for a behavioral or mental health issue, they should be 
able to collaborate with the medical professional treating the subject of the tip in order to 
more fully assess the potential for violence. The ability to conduct an accurate threat 
assessment depends on the analysis of all existing information about a subject’s previous 
behavior and medical conditions. A lack of information sharing between the medical 
community and law enforcement is often attributable to privacy laws, including provisions 
within HIPAA and FERPA, which are explored in the next chapter.  
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III. FACTORS THAT AFFECT INFORMATION SHARING 
Though medical practitioners may have information that could potentially disrupt 
a violent attack or explain a person’s abnormal behavior, depending on the nature of the 
incident—such as whether or not it is imminent—laws including HIPAA, FERPA and 42 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 2 may limit the information that can be shared 
with law enforcement. HIPAA and 42 CFR Part 2 both allow disclosures mandated by state 
laws, such as in cases of child abuse.98 Privacy concerns, ethical guidelines, and 
organizational culture also may impact information sharing between the medical 
community and law enforcement. The law enforcement community may have biases about 
the mental health community, and vice versa, that prevent them from sharing information 
and working together. Mark K. Munetz and Jennifer L.S. Teller discuss these challenges. 
They suggest that the mental health community sees law enforcement as too rigid in their 
thinking—officers are unable to understand the inability of those with mental health 
problems to control their actions; whereas law enforcement may see the mental health 
community as strange and unwilling to hold those with mental illness accountable.99 This 
chapter explores barriers to information sharing in more detail.  
A. PRIVACY CONCERNS 
1. United States Constitution 
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. The U.S. Supreme Court has declared that the Fourth 
Amendment “establishes an inferred right to privacy.”100 The Fourth Amendment requires 
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law enforcement to obtain a warrant in most cases before invading an individual’s privacy, 
though there can be exceptions.101 Privacy rights can apply to physical items as well as 
non-physical items.102 Medical information and the doctor–patient relationship have 
typically been included in this privacy right and are impacted by “laws requiring doctors 
to report treatment information to receive public healthcare funds, laws establishing 
PDMPs [prescription drug monitoring programs], and programs that disclose medical 
information to law enforcement.”103  
2. Ethics for Medical Personnel 
Privacy and confidentiality are ingrained in the training and professional conduct 
of doctors and other medical personnel. Ethics guidelines for various medical specialties 
include privacy and confidentiality considerations.104 The American Medical 
Association’s “Principles of Medical Ethics” states that “a physician shall respect the rights 
of patients, colleagues and other health professionals, and shall safeguard patient 
confidences and privacy within the constraints of the law.”105 Most physicians pledge to 
uphold an oath—which is based upon the Hippocratic Oath—upon graduating from 
medical school or being licensed as a physician.106 Modern versions include the “Yale 
Oath” or “Weill Cornell Medical College Hippocratic Oath,” both of which contain a 
component relating to the confidentiality of patient information.107 Doctors have an ethical 
duty to protect patients’ confidential information, and their allegiance is to their patients 
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first and foremost. When law enforcement seeks information about a patient’s confidential 
medical information, which doctors would not normally disclose, it can put the doctor’s 
oath at odds with law enforcement and societal needs.  
B. LAWS THAT AFFECT MEDICAL INFORMATION SHARING 
Laws that affect the medical community’s ability to share with law enforcement 
fall into two categories: laws relating to all medical information and laws relating only to 
behavioral and mental health information. HIPAA relates to medical information in 
general, and 42 CFR Part 2—as well as some state duty-to-warn laws—is specific to 
behavioral or mental health–related data. Laws relating to a mental health diagnosis are 
even more restrictive than those relating to other types of medical information. These 
restrictions may be attributable to the potential harm caused by stigmas associated with 
mental illness. Patrick W. Corrigan, Benjamin G. Druss, and Deborah A. Perlick note that 
those with mental illness may be labeled as dangerous or incompetent.108 Additionally, 
“believing that people with mental illness are dangerous leads to fear, to employers not 
wanting to hire them or to primary care providers offering below-standard medical 
care.”109 To complicate matters further, existing laws that have exceptions allowing 
information sharing, even if only during an imminent threat, may only apply to certain 
categories of medical providers such as psychiatrists or psychologists.  
Mental illness affects a significant portion of the population: one in five 
individuals.110 While the majority of people who have mental illness are not violent, the 
National Institute of Mental Health’s “Epidemiologic Catchment Area” study determined 
that, on an annual basis, those with mental health disorders experienced a relative risk of 
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violence of 7 percent, compared to the average population’s risk of 2 percent.111 
Deinstitutionalization of individuals with mental health disorders means that “mental 
health needs often go unmet.”112 It also increases the chances of law enforcement 
interacting with an individual who may display specific behavior associated with a mental 
health diagnosis. Law enforcement often does not have information pertaining to an 
individual’s diagnosis; this information would help explain the individual’s behavior, 
which would in turn help law enforcement determine if the individual is a threat.  
Stigmas attached to mental illness and behavioral health problems, and a lack of 
insurance, leave many people in need of services without treatment. In recent years, 
emergency departments, primary care doctors, and nurses have become more likely to be 
the only practitioners an individual with behavioral or mental health symptoms seeks. This 
was recognized by a nurse at Massachusetts General Hospital, who wrote in 2015 that 
significant changes in the infrastructure of the American health care system 
have resulted in the reduction of resources and services available to persons 
seeking or in need of mental health services, resulting in the utilization of 
emergency departments as a source of primary mental health care. ED 
[emergency department] nurses, as frontline health care providers, are in a 
unique position to have an impact on the safety of the individual, the staff, 
and the community when working with patients who present a danger to 
themselves or others.113  
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1. HIPAA  
The federal regulation that most law enforcement and medical professionals are 
familiar with is HIPAA. HIPAA was enacted by the U.S. Congress in 1996 in order to 
provide certain protections related to health insurance and health care information.114 It 
provides for protection of electronic medical information, seeks to combat fraud, protects 
PHI, and allows individuals to maintain health insurance upon leaving a job.115 The 
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information (Privacy Rule) 
dictates how “covered entities,” which include “health care providers, health plans and 
health care clearinghouses,” use and disclose PHI.116 Information about an individual’s 
mental health that is provided by non-medical stakeholders, such as a family member or 
friend, is not affected by HIPAA.117 HIPAA does not prohibit law enforcement officers 
from sharing information about a person’s medical conditions, as they “are not ‘covered 
entities’ under HIPAA.”118  
The Privacy Rule defines six “law enforcement purposes”—specific circumstances, 
under which PHI can be shared with law enforcement.119 The first two exceptions include 
mandated disclosure due to search warrants or other court orders, and disclosure to help 
law enforcement track missing victims, criminals, or witnesses.120 The other four 
exceptions relate to the commission of a crime, including: reporting a death that is believed 
to be caused by a crime; a formal inquiry about a known or suspected crime victim; PHI 
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related to the commission of a crime at the covered entity’s location; and “by a covered 
health care provider in a medical emergency not occurring on its premises, when necessary 
to inform law enforcement about the commission and nature of a crime, the location of the 
crime or crime victims, and the perpetrator of the crime.”121  
HIPAA also permits providers to report PHI when required by other laws, such as 
child abuse or gunshot injuries.122 If state law is contrary to the Privacy Rule, the Privacy 
Rule supersedes state law.123 The Privacy Rule limits law enforcement’s ability to receive 
medical information that could be used in a threat assessment, or that may explain an 
individual’s behavior before a violent incident occurs; the exceptions that enable release of 
information only apply once a crime has already been committed. Violations of the HIPAA 
privacy rule may result in civil or criminal penalties, including fines of up to $250,000 and 
up to ten years in jail.124 Providers may be fearful of these penalties; however, only fifty-
five fines have been imposed out of more than 184,000 complaints since the inception of 
HIPAA.125  
Furthermore, there are misconceptions about what information is legally allowed 
to be shared under HIPAA, “which has resulted in practitioner’s misapplying the law to be 
far more restrictive than the actual regulatory language requires.”126 For example, police 
took a suspect who was under arrest to the hospital for medical care and later found out the 
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subject was released without their knowledge.127 The hospital claims that HIPAA 
regulations would not allow them to share the information about the patient’s release.128 
This is a misapplication of HIPAA; since the suspect was in custody, HIPAA privacy rules 
did not apply.  
2. FERPA 
FERPA is a federal law that governs the privacy of students’ education records at 
schools that receive federal funding from the U.S. Department of Education, making it 
applicable to “virtually all public schools … and most private and public postsecondary 
institutions.”129 Education records in elementary and high schools include information 
about a student’s immunizations and school nurse records.130 At the college level, records 
relating to “medical and psychological treatment” may or may not be considered 
“education records,” depending on the situation.131 These records are considered 
“treatment records” when they are strictly used in conjunction with the student’s treatment 
and only viewed by the medical professionals administering the treatment.132 Treatment 
records may be disclosed “with the student’s written consent,” which may include prior 
consent.133 Treatment records that are disclosed to anyone other than providers 
administering treatment “are ‘education records’ under FERPA.”134  
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FERPA is unique in that, until a student is eighteen years of age, the student’s parent 
must give consent to release education records; if the student is eighteen years or older, the 
student must consent.135 FERPA provides an exception in which education records may 
be released “to appropriate parties, which may include law enforcement” without consent 
of the appropriate party, parent or student, “if knowledge of the information is necessary 
to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals.”136 FERPA does not 
apply to behavior or conversations that non-medical staff, such as professors, observe and 
does not preclude those parties from sharing that information with law enforcement.137  
The FERPA emergency exception is vague, and the concept of “necessary to protect 
the health or safety of the student or other individuals” is subjective. The literature has 
shown that poor understanding about FERPA means that “educators often err on the side 
of caution even in situations when public safety is at risk.”138  
3. 42 CFR Part 2 
42 CFR Part 2 is a federal law that protects the disclosure of data related to 
treatment programs for substance abuse if they are “federally assisted.”139 Almost every 
substance abuse program receives federal assistance of some kind, making 42 CFR Part 2 
relevant to most every substance abuse program.140 The regulation applies “to 
organizations whose sole purpose is to diagnose and treat substance use disorders, as well 
as units within larger organizations such as a clinic within a jail, prison, or hospital.”141 
Law enforcement officers are not “a ‘federally assisted program’ within the meaning of 42 
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CFR Part 2.”142 Substance abuse, like mental or behavioral health treatment, is often 
stigmatized, or its disclosure may have a negative effect on an individual’s personal or 
professional life.143 Under 42 CFR Part 2, information about an individual’s treatment may 
only be released with the patient’s consent; however, the law allows an exception for 
medical professionals in cases of medical emergency, defined as “for the purpose of 
treating a physical or mental health condition that poses an immediate threat to the 
individual’s health.”144  
Unlike HIPAA, 42 CFR Part 2 does not have an automatic exception to share 
information with law enforcement in cases of an imminent threat.145 In general, 42 CFR 
Part 2 requires law enforcement to get a court order to acquire medical information, unless 
a crime takes place at the substance abuse treatment facility or the patient has a medical 
emergency.146 Essentially, this law impedes sharing any treatment information that could 
be used to determine if an individual poses a threat to the community. 
4. State Duty-to-Warn Laws 
Duty-to-warn laws are predicated on the California Supreme Court case Tarasoff v. 
The Regents of the University of California.147 In the Tarasoff case, a patient made death 
threats against a certain—though unidentified—woman during a psychotherapist 
appointment, and the therapist did not warn the individual, who the patient then killed.148 
Even though the patient did not tell the therapist the name of the person he intended to 
harm, the court said that the therapist should have been able to determine the target’s 
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identity.149 The parents of the murdered woman sued the therapist for failing to warn their 
daughter, while the therapist argued that she only had a duty to her patient.150 The court 
ruled that “if a therapist determines or reasonably should have determined ‘that a patient 
poses a serious danger of violence to others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to 
protect the foreseeable victim of that danger.’”151  
Most states have duty-to-warn laws of some type, though they vary—for instance, 
some include nurses while others do not, and some are mandatory while others are 
voluntary.152 Several options are available to medical providers acting upon the duty to 
warn. They can inform law enforcement and/or the potential victim of the threat, or they 
may have the patient committed.153 The map in Figure 1 illustrates the U.S. states that 
have a duty to warn and those that do not, and if the duty is mandatory.  
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As of 2014, thirty-three states impose a mandatory duty to warn. The mandatory states include 
Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin, Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, and North 
Carolina. Eleven states, Alaska, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming, recognize Tarasoff as a legitimate 
piece of legislation, allowing but not mandating named professionals to warn potential victims. 
Six states, including Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Nevada, and North Dakota, have not yet 
addressed the issue of duty to warn and currently have no law pertaining to the subject. Lastly, 
only one state, Virginia, does not recognize the duty to warn.154 
Figure 1.  Duty-to-Warn Laws by State155 
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Some duty-to-warn laws are inadequate for several reasons, including the fact that 
some are not mandatory, and that some only include certain medical professionals. Laws 
that only include psychiatrists and psychologists are insufficient since many individuals 
suffering from mental health or behavioral health conditions may not ever seek treatment 
from a mental health professional, but may only interact with a primary care team or 
emergency department. Additionally, duty-to-warn laws may be ineffective in decreasing 
violent attacks; as shown in the Secret Service analysis of mass attacks in public spaces for 
2017, 57 percent of the attacks were perpetrated against random victims.156  
C. CONCLUSION  
The regulations and policies examined in this chapter are designed to protect 
individuals’ rights to privacy and protect their personal information. However, when these 
regulations are put into practice, they are usually interpreted in a narrower and more 
conservative manner than intended. The fear of retribution, whether legal or regulatory, 
causes practitioners to restrict information sharing, which impacts law enforcement’s 
ability to prevent some violent attacks. 
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IV. INTELLIGENCE / INFORMATION SHARING 
This chapter explores intelligence and information sharing initiatives already in 
place that encourage or allow information sharing between the medical community and 
law enforcement. Some of the initiatives, such as fusion centers, may not have achieved 
the integration with the medical community that they strive to create. This may be partially 
attributable to the legal inability to share PHI with law enforcement unless there is an 
imminent threat and a state duty-to-warn law. Information sharing with fusion centers would 
allow law enforcement to more proactively identify suspicious activity before a violent 
incident occurs. Successful programs such as those relating to child abuse have been in 
existence for many years and have legislation that allows information sharing.  
A. FUSION CENTERS 
After the attacks of September 11, 2001, fusion centers began to emerge at the state 
and local level in order to bridge the gap between state and local information and federal 
information and intelligence.157 Fusion centers may focus on all crimes, all hazards, all 
threats, or a combination of these. They are intended to be multi-disciplinary and may 
include law enforcement, public safety, public health, and even private sector 
representatives.158 Because fusion centers are run either locally or by the state and are 
designed to serve the needs of their area of responsibility, no two fusion centers are exactly 
alike .159 Fusion centers interact with both the Department of Homeland Security and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). As of 2018, every state has at least one fusion 
center.160  
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Fusion centers play a central role in the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting 
Initiative (NSI); many fusion centers serve as the central repository for Suspicious Activity 
Reports (SARs).161 This responsibility includes determining whether suspicious activity 
warrants further investigation. The NSI is a collaborative effort of local, state, tribal, 
territorial, and federal law enforcement to collect and analyze suspicious behavior that may 
have a nexus to preoperational planning for a terrorist incident or other criminal activity.162 
SARs are not based on an individual’s race, religion, or ethnicity; rather, they are based on 
behaviors, some of which are criminal and some of which are not.163 These behaviors are 
defined in the Information Sharing Environment  SAR Functional Standard, the most recent 
being version 1.5.5.164  
SARs can be forwarded to fusion centers by law enforcement or members of the 
public who see suspicious behavior. Upon receipt of a SAR, analysts or investigators in the 
fusion center vet the SAR by accessing all legally accessible, relevant data sets as well as 
open-source information in order to determine if the report is valid.165 If it is determined 
that the SAR is in line with the Information Sharing Environment SAR Functional 
Standard, the SAR may be passed to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force for further 
investigation.166 In addition, the SAR may be entered into eGuardian, the FBI’s 
unclassified system for tips and leads, which can be accessed by local, state, tribal, 
territorial, and federal law enforcement in order to vet additional suspicious activities 
related to the same subject, or to identify patterns and trends of behavior.167  
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When vetting a SAR, it is imperative that the fusion center has access to all 
available data in order to accurately assess the report’s validity. In contrast to the threat 
assessment process detailed by the NTAC, which involves a multi-disciplinary approach, 
the SAR process is focused on law enforcement participation to conduct comprehensive 
threat assessments.168 SAR training teaches law enforcement to understand the “difference 
between innocent cultural behaviors and behavior indicative of criminal activity.”169 Since 
SARs are focused on behaviors that may indicate criminal or terrorist activity, it is 
important to understand the factors that influence an individual’s behavior, including 
medical diagnoses.  
Many of the SARs received at fusion centers involve individuals considered to be 
emotionally disturbed persons (EDPs). Law enforcement uses the term EDP “to describe a 
person with emotional, mental, or erratic behavior that affects their decision-making 
process that may include hurting themselves or others.”170 Though statistics are not 
available related specifically to how many SARs involve EDPs, the literature addresses 
law enforcement response to and interactions with EDPs. Police Magazine provides a guide 
titled “How to Respond to an Emotionally Disturbed Person,” which suggests that law 
enforcement is “on the frontlines” of interactions with EDPs, who are “seven times more 
likely to encounter law enforcement” than individuals without mental illness; further, an 
EDP’s mental illness may affect the individual’s “thoughts, mood, behavior and the way 
they perceive the world around them.”171 Restrictions on sharing medical information, as 
described in the previous chapter, are detrimental to fusion centers, as they limit the 
center’s ability to determine if a subject’s behavior is truly a threat, or if it is due to 
behavioral or mental health issues.  
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1. Public Health Participation in Fusion Centers 
There has been a concerted effort to incorporate public health into fusion centers, 
including public health partners and data. An appendix to the Baseline Capabilities for 
State and Major Urban Area Fusion Centers published in 2011 addresses the 
integration.172 This document indicates that public health and health care personnel are 
able to “provide fusion centers with information on criminal acts and/or terrorism 
precursors,” which is further defined to include “suspicious symptoms and/or abnormal 
environmental conditions that may be caused by an emergent disease or agent or abnormal 
patterns and trends indicative of the production or abuse of narcotics.”173 The focus is on 
disease surveillance, with little to no focus on integrating medical information that may be 
useful in determining an individual’s capacity to commit a violent criminal act.  
The Department of Homeland Security’s Health Security Intelligence Enterprise 
(HSIE) was created with the goal “to make the nation safer from all crimes and all hazards, 
through timely and appropriate exchange of information among healthcare, public health 
community, and other multi-disciplinary partners, including the Intelligence Community, 
law enforcement, fire service, emergency management and private sector.”174 The HSIE 
does mention the public health sector as a contributor, stating that its role is to “use the 
appropriate protocols to share information with a fusion center on suspicious activity or 
criminal/terrorism indicators and warnings.”175 Though suspicious activity is mentioned, 
the areas for collaboration tend to focus on pandemic outbreaks and chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) monitoring. This is further evidenced by a National 
Governors Association issue brief on Improving Preparedness through Sharing Public 
Health and Homeland Security Information, which touts the work at two fusion centers, 
the Central Florida Intelligence Exchange and the Colorado Intelligence and Analysis 
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Center.176 Both fusion centers were recognized for utilizing public health data to ensure 
officer safety by providing guidelines for safely handling crime scenes that involve a 
suicide committed with hazardous materials.177 The information shared was limited to 
proper handling of hazardous materials and did not include any PHI or specific medical 
information.  
In support of outreach for the NSI SAR program, the Department of Homeland 
Security has developed a series of videos for law enforcement or other public safety 
communities that can either be viewed online or on CDs, and that fusion centers can use to 
train their partners.178 The videos are designed to help the viewers identify types of 
behavior that indicate preoperational planning for criminal activity or a terrorist event. One 
of the CDs is geared toward the emergency medical services (EMS) community.179 
However, laws and policies—such as HIPAA, barring exceptions—may prohibit EMS 
technicians from sharing observations with law enforcement if they involve PHI.  
B. OTHER PROGRAMS THAT ENABLE INFORMATION SHARING BY 
MEDICAL PROVIDERS 
In some cases, medical providers are permitted to disclose a patient’s PHI to law 
enforcement. These instances include cases of child or elder abuse, injuries sustained by 
gunshots or knives, and prescription monitoring programs. Additionally, public health 
regulations often require medical professionals to report cases of certain diseases to prevent 
outbreaks.  
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1. Child Abuse 
The Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA) was first enacted in 1974 
and has been reauthorized eight times since, most recently in 2015.180 Every state in the 
United States has a state-specific child abuse law, and no two are alike.181 The need to 
protect children from abuse takes priority over patient confidentiality in the majority of 
state child abuse laws; the laws require doctors who suspect a child has been abused or 
neglected to report the allegations to the state’s authority on child abuse.182 Law 
enforcement and child protective services usually have the responsibility for investigating 
child abuse allegations.183 Under the HIPAA privacy rule, “child abuse or neglect may be 
reported to any law enforcement official authorized by law to receive such reports.”184 In 
cases where law enforcement is not a reporting agency, doctors may still provide PHI to 
law enforcement in cases of imminent harm to the child or when investigating a missing 
child.185 Reports of child abuse or neglect usually occur after a suspected crime has been 
committed, when the medical professional detects evidence of the abuse.  
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2. Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMPs) 
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, “a prescription drug 
monitoring program (PDMP) is an electronic database that tracks controlled substance 
prescriptions in a state.”186 Data from PDMPs can be used to assess the extent of 
prescription drug problems in a state, such as the opioid crisis, and inform response 
strategies.187 Prescription drug monitoring programs are intended to detect “inappropriate 
prescribing trends” and patients who may be getting prescriptions for the same or similar 
medication from more than one doctor at a time.188 Studies measuring the effectiveness of 
PDMPs found some evidence of “changes in prescribing behaviors, use of multiple 
providers by patients, and decreased substance abuse treatment admissions.”189 The first 
prescription drug monitoring program began in California in 1939 and by 1992 there were 
PDMPs in ten states.190 By 2014, thirty-nine states had PDMPs.191  
Federal support for state PDMPs is provided through legislation called the National 
All Schedule Prescription Electronic Reporting Act (NASPER), which was passed in 2005 
and reauthorized in 2016.192 Courts have determined that it can be necessary to disclose 
medical information to a variety of medical personnel for a “legitimate governmental 
purpose,” even if it “reflects unfavorably on the character of the patient,” when the public 
interest outweighs privacy expectations.193 More than twenty states allow law enforcement 
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access to PDMP information for use in an investigation, after a crime has occurred, though 
a handful of states require a court order or subpoena.194  
In February 2018, Senate Bill 2451, the Protection for Overprescribing Act, was 
introduced in Congress.195 The bill, which has yet to be voted on, ties federal grant dollars 
to a state’s analysis and sharing of PDMP data with law enforcement.196 Medical 
information that is shared with law enforcement as a result of PDMPs is used to target the 
opioid crisis through criminal cases against physicians or patients. While abuse of 
prescriptions may lead to death and contributes to a public health crisis, individuals who 
abuse opiates are generally a threat to themselves as opposed to a violent threat to society.  
3. Injuries Caused by Violence  
Many states have laws that require doctors to report weapon-related injuries, such 
as gunshot or knife injuries—or other injuries that appear to have been inflicted during a 
criminal act—to law enforcement.197 Some states also include injuries caused by domestic 
violence in this reporting requirement.198 In fact, “forty-five states have laws that mandate 
physician reports of injuries caused by weapons, crimes, or domestic violence.”199 
Physicians’ awareness of weapon-related injury laws is not as widespread as awareness of 
child abuse reporting laws.200 The reporting requirements vary greatly by state; some 
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states require reporting of burns, for example, and others require reporting only when a 
crime is involved.201  
One such example is the Massachusetts Weapon Related Injury Surveillance 
System (WRISS), “an emergency department-based system that collects health information 
on persons treated for gunshot wounds or assault-related sharp instrument wounds.”202 
Since 1994, WRISS has been collecting information about gunshots and “‘criminally 
suspicious’ sharp instrument wounds.”203 Reporting of violence-related injuries allows 
law enforcement to investigate crimes they may not know about otherwise; but, as with 
child abuse reporting, violence-related injury reporting programs are reactive in nature, 
providing notice after a criminal act has already occurred.204 
C. MENTAL AND BEHAVIORAL HEALTH DATA SHARING 
Though laws such as HIPAA and 42 CFR Part 2 restrict sharing data related to 
mental illness or behavioral health, there are some programs that allow the sharing of this 
information with public safety professionals in order to protect the public. These limited 
instances are discussed in this section.  
1. Criminal Justice and Behavioral Health Collaborations 
The criminal justice system shares information with behavioral or mental health 
providers in order to coordinate treatment. This is prevalent among corrections facilities to 
facilitate the care of inmates before and after trial as well as for integration back into society 
once an offender is released. A special provision within HIPAA allows disclosure of mental 
health records to the  
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correctional institution or law enforcement official with custody of the 
individual, if the information is necessary for the provision of health care to 
the individual; the health and safety of the inmate, other inmates, or 
correctional officials and staff; the health and safety of those providing 
transportation from one correctional facility to another; for law enforcement 
on the premises of the correctional facility; and for the administration and 
maintenance of the safety, security, and good order of the facility. This 
general provision does not apply when the person is released on parole or 
probation or otherwise released from custody.205  
This provision relates specifically to custody within, or transport to, a correctional facility. 
A related provision does not exist that would allow mental health records to be shared with 
law enforcement before an individual enters the criminal justice system.  
2. Reporting Related to Gun Purchases 
The Gun Control Act of 1968 requires background checks for those seeking to 
purchase guns, and declares that individuals who have been “adjudicated to be mentally 
defective or who have been committed to a mental institution are prohibited from 
possessing, shipping, transporting, and receiving firearms and ammunition.”206 The Brady 
Handgun Violence Protection Act of 1993 (also known as the Brady Act) required creation 
of an electronic database for use in background checks for gun purchases. This led to the 
creation of the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), which is 
maintained by the FBI and also contains information about those deemed to be mental 
defectives. The term mental defectives is further defined as 
individuals who have been involuntarily committed to a mental institution; 
found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by reason of insanity; or 
otherwise have been determined by a court, board, commission, or other 
lawful authority to be a danger to themselves or others or to lack the mental 
capacity to contract or manage their own affairs, as a result of marked 
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subnormal intelligence or mental illness, incompetency, condition, or 
disease.207  
In 2012, the Congressional Research Service found that “a variety of technological, 
coordination, and legal (i.e., privacy) challenges limit the states’ ability to report mental 
health records to NICS.”208 These challenges include some state and federal privacy laws, 
including HIPAA, and outdated technology, as well as law enforcement’s inability to 
access mental health records to share with NICS.209 Additionally, the Congressional 
Research Service reported that, prior to 2013, Congress debated whether HIPAA or other 
privacy laws prohibited mental health data from being submitted to NICS.210 Under the 
HIPAA privacy rule, a state mandate is the exception that allows states to report to NICS. 
The Congressional Research Service determined that “it is not clear that there are any other 
provisions in the privacy rule that provide such a permission.”211 Therefore, without a state 
mandate, reporting to NICS may not be allowed.  
As of January 2013, the Congressional Research Service found that twenty-three 
states have laws requiring reporting to NICS.212 An additional seven—Arizona, Florida, 
Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia—have laws that allow 
but do not require disclosure to NICS. Eight states—Arkansas, California, Hawaii, 
Massachusetts, Maryland, Michigan, Ohio, and Utah—do not have laws that mention 
NICS reporting at all, though they collect relevant data at the state level. The remaining 
twelve states and the District of Columbia do not collect any data that would be relevant to 
reporting to NICS.213  
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Additionally, while law enforcement generally provides the records to NICS, 
information about an involuntary commitment resides in medical records that law 
enforcement do not have access to.214 Figure 2 depicts the state of reporting to NICS in 
January 2013. 
 
Figure 2.  State Laws that Require or Authorize the Reporting of Mental Health 
Records to NICS215 
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In 2014, a new rule was proposed by the Department of Health and Human Services 
to facilitate the sharing of information by covered entities with NICS or “to a state 
repository of NICS data,” which might be a law enforcement agency.216 A final rule issued 
by the Department of Health and Human Services became effective in February 2016; this 
rule created an “express permission” within HIPAA that allows covered entities to report 
“individuals who are subject to a Federal ‘mental health prohibitor’ that disqualifies them 
from shipping, transporting, possessing, or receiving a firearm” directly to NICS or to the 
state agency responsible for reporting to NICS.217 As of the date of this thesis, data relative 
to the effectiveness of this rule change was not available.  
D. CONCLUSION 
There are provisions in HIPAA and 42 CFR Part 2 that allow some medical 
information to be shared with law enforcement and other public safety agencies, under 
certain circumstances. Even when laws or programs are in place that allow information 
sharing to occur, however, there can be inadequacies—such as a lack of awareness or 
improper application of the involved legal requirements. In the case of the Virginia Tech 
gunman, for example, Cho’s name was not entered into NICS due to a discrepancy between 
federal law and Virginia’s understanding of what constitutes “involuntary commitment,” 
which allowed Cho to purchase two weapons.218  
The programs and laws addressed in this chapter allow information sharing when a 
suspected crime has already occurred or is imminent, such as in cases of child abuse, 
injuries caused by violence, and prescription drug abuse. In terms of sharing mental or 
behavioral health data, however, the allowable reasons for sharing are very narrow—either 
related to an individual who is incarcerated or to prevent individuals with certain illnesses 
from purchasing a firearm. These legal allowances and programs are insufficient; they do 
not allow law enforcement to obtain information that would assist in the threat assessment 
process to proactively address a threat to the community before an act of violence occurs. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The nature of violent attacks necessitates better coordination and integration of all 
relevant information about a subject’s background, both criminal and medical, to inform 
threat assessments and ensure the safety of the public. A review of several relatively recent 
violent incidents in the United States has shown that the lack of information sharing 
between the medical community and law enforcement has contributed to law 
enforcement’s inability to thwart attacks before they happen.  
As previously stated, privacy laws and the public perception of privacy—especially 
in terms of mental health data—due to stigmas associated with mental illness are often at 
odds with the need to share information for legitimate law enforcement purposes. Also, the 
fear of retribution, whether legal or regulatory, causes practitioners to err on the side of 
caution and avoid sharing, which negatively affects law enforcement’s ability to prevent 
some violent attacks.  
Current laws and programs are insufficient to proactively address the threat of 
violence to the community. It is necessary to modify or create new statutory language to 
address legal barriers. Under these circumstances, this thesis provides several 
recommendations to amend the current legal framework in order to increase information 
sharing between the medical field and law enforcement. 
1. Privacy Laws Are Deficient 
Threat assessment guidelines recognize the importance of gathering information 
from non–law enforcement sources; the NTAC specifically includes “history of mental 
illness” as a necessary component of understanding an individual’s behavior in order to 
ensure the most accurate threat assessment is compiled.219 Dating back to the Tarasoff 
case in 1976, the California Supreme Court ruled that “if a therapist determines or 
reasonably should have determined ‘that a patient poses a serious danger of violence to 
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others, he bears a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect the foreseeable victim of that 
danger.’”220 Though it would be impossible to prevent every violent attack, the more 
information available to conduct threat assessments may improve law enforcement’s 
ability to preempt some attacks.  
A lack of information sharing between the medical community and law 
enforcement is often attributable to federal or state privacy laws. Current laws that require 
information sharing are limited in some instances—applying only when there is imminent 
danger—and ambiguous in others, such as in the interpretation of FERPA laws relating to 
student records. In the absence of legal barriers, unfamiliarity with the laws or improper 
application of the laws may contribute to a lack of information sharing.  
The after-action review following the Virginia Tech tragedy recommended that 
“Congress and the state legislatures should review federal and state privacy laws, and 
universities should know what they do and do not permit”; the review noted that HIPAA, 
FERPA, and state privacy laws should be reviewed to ensure that they are compatible and 
that they meet the real needs of our society.221 More than ten years after the Virginia Tech 
tragedy, HIPAA and FERPA have not been amended.  
(1) Recommendation #1: Privacy Laws Need to Be Evaluated and 
Amended 
A legal analysis of privacy laws is necessary. This thesis reaffirms the suspicion 
that the laws are deficient and identifies gaps and limitations that inhibit the ability of law 
enforcement and the medical community to share medical information for threat 
assessment purposes. This thesis is a necessary precursor to conducting a comprehensive 
legal analysis of HIPAA, FERPA, 42 CFR Part 2, and state duty-to-warn laws. Legal analysis 
will determine whether any proposed amendments are necessary to preempt violent attacks 
against the community. 
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Privacy advocates and citizens may view the increased ability for law enforcement 
to obtain medical information as a violation of an individual’s civil rights. Another 
limitation may be the fact that each state’s laws—such as duty-to-warn laws or mandatory 
reporting of medical information—are different. Any amendments to federal laws must 
take this into consideration. 
(2) Recommendation #2: States Could Enact Laws That Mandate 
Information Sharing between the Medical Community and Law 
Enforcement  
The HIPAA privacy rule permits providers to report PHI when required by other 
laws, such as in cases of child abuse or gunshot injuries.222 42 CFR Part 2 allows 
disclosures mandated by state laws.223 States could enact individual laws that mandate 
information sharing between the medical community and law enforcement for the purposes 
of threat assessment, which would then allow release of the information under HIPAA and 
42 CFR Part 2. Current state laws that enable the sharing of medical information for 
specific programs or purposes are not consistent among states. Each state would have to 
conduct its own legal analysis to determine how existing state and federal laws would 
impact any newly proposed laws or amendments. Privacy advocates would likely try to 
block these types of laws from being created. 
2. Training on Privacy Laws Is Deficient 
Insufficient training makes it difficult for law enforcement and the medical 
community to understand the specific provisions of each of the laws analyzed. For 
example, both HIPAA and 42 CFR Part 2 allow disclosures mandated by state law; but 
unlike HIPAA, 42 CFR Part 2 does not have an automatic exception to share information 
with law enforcement in cases of an imminent threat.224 Additionally, law enforcement 
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officers are not prohibited from sharing information about a person’s medical conditions 
under HIPAA, as they are not considered “covered entities.”225  
(3) Recommendation #3: Training for Both Law Enforcement and the 
Medical Community 
Misconceptions exist in both vocations regarding the current privacy laws that 
govern the ability to share medical information. For example, Virginia Tech believed that 
the university could not disclose Cho’s disciplinary records to law enforcement due to 
FERPA.226 Training should be provided to law enforcement and the medical community 
to ensure that they understand the specific circumstances governing when information 
sharing is allowable and the extent of the information that can be shared.  
Opponents of training may argue that it is too expensive or time consuming. 
Training could be accomplished as a component of continuing education, such as in-service 
training for law enforcement, in which the cost could potentially be absorbed into work 
performed by already existing teaching staff and classroom facilities. Those in the medical 
community are already required to participate in continuing education by a licensing 
authority. Training on privacy laws could be offered for continuing medical education 
credits. Professional associations such as the American Medical Association or the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) could offer training at conferences or 
provide reference materials about the applicability of the current laws to their 
constituencies. For example, the IACP conducts an annual conference that includes training 
seminars; conference registration costs as little as $425 for its members who register early, 
and as much as $725 for non-members who do not register early.227 A review of the 2018 
conference agenda shows twelve legal topics being offered.228 A training block on the 
                                                 
225 Petrila and Fader-Towe, Information Sharing in Criminal Justice, 5. 
226 Davis, “Connecting the Dots,” 11. 
227 “Registration Information,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, accessed August 9, 
2018, https://www.theiacpconference.org/event-overview/registration-category-and-fees/#site-navigation.  
228 “Events,” International Association of Chiefs of Police, accessed August 9, 2018, 
https://plan.core-apps.com/iacp2018/events?trackIds=2f717394f6594a422becdcebe6e05d82.  
53 
privacy laws that impact sharing medical information could be offered in a similar fashion 
at future conferences. 
3. Collaboration between Law Enforcement and the Medical 
Community Is Necessary 
Threat assessment guidelines from the NTAC note that “prevention efforts are more 
effective when community partners collaborate to include law enforcement, behavioral and 
mental health services, social services, local citizens and others.”229 Organizational culture 
may impact information sharing between the medical community and law enforcement. 
The law enforcement community may have biases about the mental health community, and 
vice versa, that prevent them from sharing information and working together. Ethics 
guidelines for various medical specialties include privacy and confidentiality 
considerations.230 Those in the medical community may be concerned about violating the 
doctor–patient relationship if they share information about an individual’s medical 
condition or medical records with law enforcement.231  
(4) Recommendation #4: Enhance Collaboration between Law 
Enforcement and the Medical Community through Joint Training or 
Exercises 
Opportunities for the two disciplines to work together will bring greater familiarity 
and could help establish communications and trust, and provide each group with a better 
understanding of the other’s needs. Research shows that the health community recognizes 
the increasing role it plays in dealing with potentially dangerous patients, and law 
enforcement recognizes the need to have access to the subject-matter expertise of the 
medical community. Bringing the two groups together through exercises or joint training 
will help them foster relationships and interact with one another outside of times of crisis. 
A study titled “Disaster Exercise Outcomes for Professional Emergency Personnel and 
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Citizen Volunteers” found that after participation in an exercise, participants’ “confidence 
in collective teamwork … nearly doubled.”232  
Opponents of joint exercises or training may cite cost and time considerations. 
However, there may be a government agency in a given state, such as an emergency 
management agency, that is already tasked with creating and conducting exercises. Grant 
funding also can sometimes be used to fund exercises.  
B. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This thesis reaffirms the suspicion that privacy laws are deficient and it identifies 
gaps and limitations that inhibit information sharing between the medical community and 
law enforcement to identify people who are a threat to the community. While the notion of 
intelligence-led policing has been in vogue for some time, including the medical 
community as a source of intelligence is a newer idea. Once the legal hurdles are 
eliminated, research could focus on how best to integrate medical intelligence into law 
enforcement practices while recognizing individuals’ rights to privacy. There is minimal 
research on culture or professional biases in either community that prevent information 
sharing. While this thesis introduced the concept of threat assessment only in so far as to 
reveal the need for inclusion of both law enforcement and medical professionals, further 
research could be conducted on threat assessment methodologies to determine which one(s) 
are most effective.  
C. SUMMARY 
It has been known for quite some time that privacy laws create barriers to sharing 
medical information that could potentially prevent an attack with law enforcement. Legal 
hurdles still remain in place, even after these barriers have been recognized both in official 
after-action documents and in the news media. Maintaining the status quo is not the best 
option for the safety of U.S. citizens. After conducting a comprehensive review of literature 
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and laws, the next step is a legal analysis to determine the changes necessary to the current 
laws or to enact new laws that will address the deficiencies.  
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